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Charitable Contributions in Lieu of SALT Deductions
by David Gamage
California and other states are considering 
new charitable tax credits to do end runs around 
the 2017 federal tax overhaul’s cap on state and 
local tax deductions.1 Will these plans work?
Yes, but with some qualifications. Along with 
seven other tax law professors, I am a coauthor on 
a draft essay2 arguing that federal law enables 
states to offer tax credits for charitable 
contributions to state programs in a manner that 
could circumvent the SALT deduction cap. While 
I obviously agree with the essay’s analysis, my 
views are not fully explicated, which is where this 
follow-up comes in.
First, I should specify what we are talking 
about. It is helpful here to distinguish between (1) 
what I will call the “aggressive way” to structure 
a state-level tax credit of that sort, and (2) what I 
will call the “smarter way” to do so.
The aggressive way to structure this plan is for 
a state to offer a 100 percent tax credit for 
charitable donations to the state’s general fund. 
The goal here is to incentivize state residents 
whose federal-level deductions for state-level 
taxes will be capped to instead make charitable 
contributions to the state government to reduce 
their state-level taxes. Under current law, 
voluntary donations to state general funds qualify 
for the federal-level charitable contribution 
deduction. Thus, this plan would allow state 
residents to effectively transform nondeductible 
state-level tax payments into fully deductible 
charitable contribution deductions to the state.
The smarter way to do that would be for a state 
to offer a less than 100 percent credit for charitable 
donations to funds set up for specific state 
programs, with a cap on the total amount 
creditable per taxpayer. For instance, a state might 
offer a 90 percent credit for donations made to a 
fund to support public colleges and universities 
with the state. A state could set up multiple funds 
to offer choices as to which programs residents 
want to support.
Note here that a 90 percent (or lower) credit 
would still enable participants to come out ahead 
after tax for making a qualifying donation. If a 
taxpayer in the new 24 percent federal income tax 
bracket were to make a $100 qualifying charitable 
contribution through such a program, that 
taxpayer would save $90 of state-level taxes and 
$24 of federal-level taxes. The full after-tax return 
would thus be $114 of combined tax savings from 
the $100 contribution.
Do those plans work under federal law? The 
answer is clearly yes, at least in the sense that 
existing legal authorities overwhelmingly support 
them working. Indeed, many states already offer 
credits for charitable contributions of that sort, 
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1
See, e.g., Riley McDermid, “Move to Work Around Federal Tax Cap 
Gets Key Vote From California Lawmakers,” San Francisco Business Times, 
Jan. 31, 2018. 
2
Joseph Bankman et al., “Federal Income Tax Treatment of Charitable 
Contributions Entitling Donor to a State Tax Credit” (unpublished 
manuscript, Jan. 11, 2018).
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with the credit amount reaching 100 percent in 
some cases.3 As our group essay explains in 
greater depth, the IRS has blessed these programs 
(albeit with low-level guidance), and numerous 
judicial decisions also support taxpayers’ 
receiving full federal-level charitable contribution 
deductions for donations to these programs.4
Of course, it is possible to distinguish the legal 
authorities that support these plans. Thus, the IRS 
could perhaps justify challenging newly enacted 
plans, especially for plans structured more like 
the aggressive way than the safe way. But the IRS 
would face an uphill battle in challenging these 
plans based on existing legal authorities.
A more complicated and interesting question 
is who has the power to change that aspect of 
federal tax law. Congress clearly has the authority 
to revise it through legislation that would deny 
federal-level charitable contribution deductions 
for donations to these programs.
But do Treasury and the IRS have the power to 
revise that aspect of federal tax law absent new 
legislation? My view is that they could through 
exercise of their regulatory authority — that is, by 
issuing a new Treasury regulation. However, it’s 
less clear whether the IRS could change that 
aspect of federal tax law on its own, without using 
the Department of the Treasury’s regulatory 
powers.
With all of that in mind, should states design 
new programs and, if they do, how should 
Treasury and the IRS respond? These nuanced 
questions lack clear and straightforward answers. 
In contrast to at least some of my group essay 
coauthors, I consider the prior federal-level SALT 
deduction to be suboptimal federal policy5 and 
would favor well-designed approaches to cap or 
eliminate it. However, the new federal-level cap is 
poorly designed.
In particular, I worry that by capping the 
federal deduction for state and local personal 
income taxes, while leaving business-level 
deductions for state and local taxes mostly 
uncapped — especially deductions for state 
corporate income taxes — the new law will 
incentivize states to shift their revenue-raising 
from personal to corporate income taxes. My 
concern then is that the negative consequences 
from that tax shift will ultimately overpower any 
positives of capping the federal deduction for 
state and local personal income taxes.
A more comprehensive evaluation of the 
policy concerns and tradeoffs regarding these 
questions is beyond this essay’s scope. But even 
for those who — like me — would support 
capping federal SALT deductions in the abstract, 
there are reasons to fear that the new federal cap 
on these deductions might do more harm than 
good.
Moreover, regarding the question of how state 
governments should act, it must be recognized 
that they primarily have a duty to their residents 
and only secondarily to federal policy concerns. 
Of course, cooperation among states and between 
states and the federal government is important. In 
other scenarios, the merits of promoting 
cooperation should perhaps trump a state’s 
desires to act in the narrow interests of its 
residents.
Yet in the scenarios we are faced with, states 
have been subjected to new federal legislation that 
was rushed through in a secretive, highly partisan 
manner.6 In these circumstances, it seems 
reasonable for states like California and New York 
to respond with measures that promote the 
interests of state residents over arguably 
countervailing national interests regarding 
cooperation.
By contrast, Treasury and the IRS are charged 
with promoting the national interest regarding 
tax policy and tax design. With that in mind, 
should Treasury and the IRS then use their 
regulatory powers to combat state-level efforts of 
that sort?
One reason for Treasury and the IRS to be 
cautious is that there are serious administrative 
concerns that would follow from how either 
might use its regulatory authority for those 
purposes. My essay coauthors are working on a 3
For a list and explanation of current state-level programs of that 
sort, see Appendix A of Bankman et al., supra note 2.
4
Id.
5
My views can be found in Gamage and Darien Shanske, “Tax 
Cannibalization and Fiscal Federalism in the United States,” 111 Nw. U. 
L. R 295 (2017).
6
See Samuel A. Donaldson, “Understanding the Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act” (Jan. 8, 2018) (“the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was the product of a 
deeply partisan and largely closed-door process”).
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follow-up to explain those problems, so I will not 
elaborate here.
Another reason for Treasury and the IRS to 
refrain from using regulatory authority, at least 
regarding the smarter way design, is that states 
might then respond with other approaches to 
effectively preserve the benefits of the federal 
SALT deduction. Along with another set of 
coauthors, I explain some of these approaches in 
two other draft essays.7 We are currently revising 
and explaining the arguments in those essays to 
submit for publication.
Considering the myriad options available to 
states, Treasury and the IRS ultimately lack the 
power to prevent them from acting to preserve the 
benefits of the prior SALT deduction. Doing so 
effectively would require new, better drafted 
federal-level legislation. For instance, Daniel 
Hemel has described other approaches that states 
could take in “States and Localities Can Offset 
Federal Tax Law’s Impact on Their Residents.”8 
And at the extreme, no regulatory authority 
would enable Treasury or the IRS to prevent state 
governments from just shifting away from the use 
of personal income taxes and toward the use of 
(fully deductible) corporate income taxes.
Again, fully evaluating these possibilities is 
beyond the scope of this article. For here and now, 
my conclusions are just the following:
1. Under current federal law, the smarter 
way design should work.
2. Treasury and the IRS have the 
regulatory authority to change that aspect 
of federal law.
3. However, absent new federal 
legislation, there are persuasive policy 
reasons for Treasury and the IRS to refrain 
from issuing those regulations.
4. Ultimately, new federal legislation is 
needed to fix the flawed cap on federal 
SALT deductions.                                      
7
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “The Games They Will Play: An Update on 
the Conference Committee Tax Bill” (unpublished manuscript); and Avi-
Yonah et al., “The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and 
Glitches Under the New Legislation” (unpublished manuscript).
8
Daniel Jacob Hemel, “States and Localities Can Offset Federal Tax 
Law’s Impact on Their Residents,” Bloomberg Tax: Daily Tax Report: State 
(Jan. 12, 2018).
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